I was heartened to read about the work of Kenya’s Professor Mary Abukutsa-Onyango on preserving and promoting the cultivation of indigenous crops. Many of the plants and vegetables that were spurned by the well fed as food for the poor are making a return and are to be found in Kenya’s supermarkets and restaurants. I was also saddened to learn that the father of the Green Revolution, Norman Borlaug, died last week.

Borlaug decades long passion for tackling starvation has been matched by that of Professor Mary Abukutsa-Onyango. He, like Professor Abukutsa-Onyango, was a plant scientist. He had seen the Misissippi Dustbowl which many believed was caused through technological farming. Borlaug thought the problem was due to too little technology and that high yield drought resistant crops could prevent future dustbowls. In 1948 at the behest of the Rockefeller Institute Borlaug was requested to help poor farmers in Mexico.

The Rockefellers had many interests in the country and the country was seething with revolutionary fervour because people were hungry. When he arrived in Mexico Borlaug despaired. Yields were low, crops had been ravaged by disease and the soil had been depleted. Over time he developed a stout strain of wheat which grew quickly and helped avert a food crisis. An essential element to the high yields was the use of chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides.

By 1953 Borlaug had developed over 40 varieties of wheat that were drought and disease resistant. On a small patch of land he had been able to triple and quadruple the amount of wheat that could be grown. By the 1960’s Mexico’s wheat output had outstripped that of the 1940’s sixfold, turning Mexico into a country self-sufficient in producing cereal grains.

Seeing what was possible Borlaug began to argue that what was good for Mexico could be good for Africa and Asia. This was seen as controversial as it meant replacing indigenous crops with western wheat.

In 1961 with funding from the Rockefeller Institute and the Ford Foundation Borlaug established the International Rice Research Institute for Rice in the Phillipines and turned his attention to rice. The risk of famine was now threatening the Asian sub-continent as population was outstripping food production.

Borlaug’s initial attempts to persuade the Indian and Pakistani government to adopt his wheat varieties initially fell on deaf ears. The countries were bitterly divided and still at war with each other. But as a food famine loomed they soon came around and asked Borlaug for his advice. Before long they were shipping in his Mexican seed varieties by the ton.

Asian scientists began testing his wheat varieties and found they did exceptionally well. Farmers were also given aid in the form of fertilizers and by 1968 Pakistan had become self-sufficient in wheat and India followed a few years later. India had such a surplus of wheat it was having to turn schools into temporary granaries. By the 1980’s India had turned into a net exporter of wheat. The same thing was repeated in the Phillipines as farmers switched to Borlaug’s dwarf varieties. Then China followed and today it is the world’s largest producer of food. What Borlaug achieved was considered to be nothing short of a miracle and was soon dubbed the “Green Revolution”.

I was a young development worker in the Mekong Delta in 1968 when this new “miracle rice” from the Philippines arrived. Its impact in the eight villages in which I worked was as stunning as it was immediate. The four villages that were accessible by road experienced dramatic improvements, both in terms of nutrition and the well being of the people. New IR-8 rice spread rapidly as peasant farmers with small plots were suddenly able to experience both increased yields and double crops. This in turn led to tangible improvements in the quality of life: child mortality dropped; malnutrition abated; and children, especially girls, stayed in school longer.

At the same time, there was a rapid corresponding decrease in the level of armed conflict and military hostilities. It was as though the combination of new roads and new rice seed caused the roots of violent extremism to wither and disappear in a way that military action alone could not. By contrast, the four other villages, with no bridges and no road access, remained mired in poverty: the new “miracle seeds” were not put to use; children remained stunted; and warfare and political dissidence continued there unabated.

In 1970 he was honoured for his work and awarded the nobel peace prize.

He is credited with saving the lives of a billion people through creating rice and wheat hybrids which everywhere, save for Africa, were responsible for increasing food production faster than the rate of population growth. But it was this success at saving lives that led to a backlash by Malthussian environmentalists who saw population growth as the biggest threat to the earth’s ecosystems.

Borlaug too was a neo-Malthussian who believed the world was overpopulated, once saying that feeding the starving was only feeding “the population monster” and he had wanted to see governments tackle population by lowering birth rates. In his Nobel acceptance speech he said, “There can be no permanent progress in the battle against hunger until the agencies that fight for increased food production and those that fight for population control unite in a common effort.” Further he argued that introducing hybrid varieties to Africa would save its wild habitats because hybrid varieties could produce higher yields on less land thus preserving Africa’s wild habitats from “slash and burn” subsistence agriculture.

By the time Borlaug had begun work in Africa in the 1980’s environmental lobbyists had succeeded in persuading the World Bank and Ford Foundation to stop funding most of his African agricultural projects. The Rockefeller Institute also shied away from supporting him as it now began to concentrate on bio-technology. It was argued that tractors and intensive farming methods had no place in Africa. Borlaug’s methods had created dependence on monoculture crops, unsustainable farming practices, heavy indebtedness among subsistence farmers, and high levels of cancer among those who work with agriculture chemicals. Today environmentalists also express doubts about the long-term sustainability of farming practices encouraged by the Green Revolution in both the developed and the developing world.

Borlaug’s response was that the lobbyists “have never experienced the physical sensation of hunger. They do their lobbying from comfortable office suites in Washington or Brussels. If they lived just one month amid the misery of the developing world, as I have for 50 years, they’d be crying out for tractors and fertilizer and irrigation canals and be outraged that fashionable elitists in wealthy nations were trying to deny them these things.”

Borlaug found his work hampered in Africa by poor transportation systems. He complained “The potential’s there, but you can’t eat potential. The transport system is miserable. We have to bring in fertilizer. And as soon as you get these little farms producing, there has to be better transport to move the excess green to the cities of those countries where there are food shortages.” Equally factors such as irrigation systems and organized economies that had led to success in Asia were lacking in Africa. Most of Borlaug’s work tended to be concentrated in the developed parts of Africa and where they were implemented yields increased.

So far so good. The conventional wisdom about world hunger is that there is not enough food to feed everybody so we must grow more. Yet globally food yields have risen since Borlaug began his work in the 1940’s and there is more than enough food to feed the world’s population. Global hunger’s cause is therefore not one of production but distribution.

Global production rose by 11% since the 1970’s but much of that transformation happened within China. Subtract China from the equation and global hunger rose by 11%.

In South America, hunger grew by nearly 20 percent despite impressive gains in output driven, in part, by improved crop varieties. Those varieties required large landholdings in order to be economically efficient, which meant that the peasants working that land had to be kicked off. Those displaced peasants migrated to the hillsides and tropical forests, doubling the area of cultivated land–in other words, the increase in food came not only through technology but also simply by having food growing on a greater area.

Part 1

Is that a pig or is it a plane…

Hallelujah! A landmark trial has ended with British firm Mabey and Johnson being convicted of bribing foreign officials. The firm admitted to paying bribes to officials around the world to win contracts. This trial is the first of its kind and more are expected to follow.

Mabey and Johnson builds bridges and many of its contracts were subsidised by British taxpayers. The firm is expected to pay out more than £6.5 million to foreign governments as fines and reparations.

Today, at Southwark crown court, London, John Hardy QC for the SFO, revealed the names of 12 individuals in six countries alleged to have received bribes from the Reading-based Mabey and Johnson.

He said the company paid “a wide-ranging series of bribes” totalling £470,000 to politicians and officials in Ghana.

He identified five who travelled to Britain to collect sums of money from £10,000 to £55,000 from bank accounts in London and Watford.

Ministers and officials in Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Bangladesh, and Jamaica were also bribed, Hardy told the court.

Hardy said that over eight years, the firm gave £100,000 “to buy the favours” of Joseph Hibbert, a key Jamaican official in awarding contracts, one of them worth £14m.

The court was told how the firm, owned by one of Britain’s richest families, paid bribes totalling £1m to foreign politicians and officials to get export orders valued at £60m to £70m through covert middlemen.

The Mabey family built up a fortune of more than £200m by selling steel bridges internationally.

The company also broke UN sanctions by illegally paying £363,000 to Saddam Hussein’s government from 2001 – 2002

The UK Serious Fraud squad is now eyeing BAE which will open a massive can of worms should it go ahead. I wait with baited breath.


Haiti – The Politics of Rice

Inside USAID – Subsidising agriculture in the North, starving the poor in the South.

Viktor Bout interview

Viktor Bout, the Russian accused of being the world’s biggest arms dealer, has angrily denied allegations that he supplied weapons to the Taliban and al-Qaida in his first interview for six years with the western media. Bout is currently languishing in a maximum security prison in Bangkok after being arrested in March last year in a sting operation by American agents. The United States has requested his extradition and final court hearings are expected to take place next week.

Bout said that the allegations against him were “lies and bullshit”. He said: “I never supplied arms as such at all and I never especially never had any deal with al-Qaida.” Asked if it was possible that planes owned by him carried weapons without his knowledge, he said: “I could not exclude that.” During four separate interviews with Channel 4 News, he later admitted that his planes did ship arms into Afghanistan in 1996 for the government during the civil war it fought against the Taliban.

Bout, who has been nicknamed “the Merchant of Death” and “the embargo buster”, became a notorious figure during the 1990s, when he was accused of illegally smuggling arms to numerous African regimes and conflicts.

The UN has accused him of arming the alleged war criminal Charles Taylor in Liberia, as well as rebels in Sierra Leone and the Congo. He was arrested in a five-star hotel last March while allegedly discussing the sale of shoulder-launched missiles with US agents masquerading as Colombian rebels from FARC. The request to Thai authorities to arrest Bout says the US feared he was travelling on a British passport, number K163077. UK officials have declined to comment.

His latest denials were treated with scepticism by those responsible for investigating his activities during the 1990s. Former foreign minister Peter Hain, who originally tagged him “the Merchant of Death”, said: “He was fuelling the war in Sierra Leone, where terrorists with guns were cutting off the limbs of civilians and shooting the people of the country, and they would not have been able to do that if were it not for his arms coming in.” Johan Peleman, who investigated him for the UN, said: “I would not – like some – call him the McDonald’s of the arms business. I think he’s more a very talented and cunning businessman.”

In the orange shirt and shorts of a Thai prison uniform, Bout cuts a much slimmer figure than before. While happy to admit associating with warlords, he denies all accusations of wrongdoing.

Bout, 42, admitted he had worked for his “very close friend” Jean-Pierre Bemba, a warlord who became the vice-president of the Congo, who is now in the Hague awaiting trial for orchestrating rape, mass murder and child soldiering. Bout said: “I know Bemba very well and I am telling you from any point of view he would never give any orders, especially to rape women in the Central African Republic” – one of the crimes of which Bemba is accused.

Bout’s supposed client list reads like a Who’s Who of the world’s nastiest warlords but also includes Americans, Britons, Frenchmen and Russians. A former US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, has admitted that planes connected to his department did fly supplies into Iraq to aid the US occupation. Bout said it was possible that these deliveries were made by a company run by his brother, Sergei. He denied earlier reports that he shipped armoured cars into Iraq for Britain. He said the French government did hire him to fly its troops into the Congo in 1994 for Operation Turquoise, a relief mission after the Rwanda genocide.

Some analysts suspect that Bout’s activities were linked to Russian intelligence. He denies this, but, asked if he worked for the Russian state, he said: “Sometimes, yeah. We did the flights.” His battle against extradition has now become intensely political. Some observers have speculated that he is of high value to the US because of his alleged links to Igor Sechin, a deputy to Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin and one of the Kremlin’s most powerful figures. He denied any such links or ever meeting Sechin, saying that the two men did not – as is claimed – serve as intelligence officers in Mozambique at the same time. The last days of Bout’s court hearings are on Tuesday and Wednesday and a decision is expected within a month.

Although one estimate had his wealth at $6 billion, Bout said he was bankrupt. He said: “I have my [principles], I did not do this just for money, otherwise I would be definitely way more richer and would not be in this position [in jail]. I did not move arms for the Taliban, I did not move arms for many other people.” He added: “I would do the same [all over again]. These are the decisions of my heart and my mind. So what, what’s wrong?”

• Exclusive interview with Viktor Bout, the Merchant Of Death, Channel 4 News, tomorrow, 7pm

Where’s the sense of proportion in all of this?

This morning I nearly fell off the sofa while watching BBC News24 when a report outlining how Rwanda is behind the genocide in the Congo was broadcast. The fleeing of people from Goma initiated this report. It even went so far as to say that we have all been told lies about what really happened in the Congo. Was this really happening? I had to rewind the V+box to replay this news again and again just to make sure that I had not misheard the report. But no, I had heard correctly. Mention was made of how the regions mineral wealth has fuelled the crisis and how Kivu has become the prize fought over by Rwandan businessmen. This was extraordinary. Truth was finally dribbling through my box! Was my hardening cynicism of the function of the media going to have to be relaxed? When had I last heard the British Broadcasting propaganda service for the corporate elites do something as revolutionary as telling the truth? But here was the BBC telling their viewers that “Tutsi rebels” paid for by Rwandan businessmen have been committing crimes against humanity and well basically, it has to stop, chaps. Does one Messrs Tony Blair know this? Having appointed himself envoy to Rwanda recently he must be made aware of these facts straight away.

Talk of humanitarian intervention was interspersed with pictures of ragged Congolese men stoning UN blue tops as they passed in their shiny white tanks and the finger of blame was pointed at them by the BBC for failing to prevent the deaths of one million people. There was video too of Kagame’s men in crisply pressed new green uniforms filmed from sinister angles decrying their innocence. No mention was made of the fact that the BBC had bought these lies and why but I was prepared to forgive this omittance at this point and the fact they got the death toll wrong, it’s closer to 5 million who have died in the DR Congo at the rate of 45,000 a month since the Rwandans invaded the country ostensibly to hunt down Hutu rebels.

A developing story so more was bound to leak through the miasma. But just as the horror of what has transpired in the Eastern region of DR Congo, and why, threatened to dominate the headlines it was killed dead in its tracks at about 10.00 am by the very important coverage of bad boy comedian Russell Brand and partner in crime tv presenter Jonathan Woss and their crime of having made a rude call in the middle of the night to a grand-father about some sexual dalliance Brand had supposedly enjoyed with his grand-daughter. And that was that.

Other bad boy friends of Brand and Ross came forward to tell us this was a conspiracy of the left media to tarnish these good people. Calls for the resignation of the lads and producers who had allowed their obscene behaviour to filter through to the public at 2.00 am in the morning was gathering steam. None of this I would have heard anyway if it had not been relayed to me through the media as I happened to be fast asleep in the early hours of Sunday morning and I don’t listen to dead-wood like Radio 2. By this morning the deluge of calls for the sacking of anybody that had come within 2 feet of Brand and Ross was in full swing. Complaints that had been received by OFCOM on Monday morning had swelled from 4000 to over 10,000 today.

The report on DR Congo, as far as I can see, has not made it to the website but you can hear what the important news stories in the UK are today.

Russell quit his job as Radio 2 presenter in a video in which he claimed to be contrite over his bad behaviour, intriguingly, a picture of Joseph Stalin could be spied behind him as he explained himself and offered up his resignation. This was no accident on Russell’s part as he’s a smart man. George Orwell, no lover of the BBC, I think would have commiserated with Brand and understood the significance of this detail.

Now watch the BBC version. What’s missing? I think my cynicism about the media is hardening… again!

In the meantime Johan Hari wrote an article for the Independent on the crimes being carried out in our names in the Congo. We are all a party to this genocide because people being killed in the Congo are dying over coltan which is used in the manufacture of the mobile phones we use. I remember explaining this to a Bigfish back in 2003 who thought I was nuts but Hari gets it.

Now wouldn’t it be great if the BBC could get just as indignant and self-righteous about people dying in the Congo in wars as it does about Brand and Ross playing pranks in the middle of the night?

The Right to the City

New Left Review 53, September-October 2008

Examining the link between urbanization and capitalism, David Harvey suggests we view Haussmann’s reshaping of Paris and today’s explosive growth of cities as responses to systemic crises of accumulation—and issues a call to democratize the power to shape the urban experience.


We live in an era when ideals of human rights have moved centre stage both politically and ethically. A great deal of energy is expended in promoting their significance for the construction of a better world. But for the most part the concepts circulating do not fundamentally challenge hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market logics, or the dominant modes of legality and state action. We live, after all, in a world in which the rights of private property and the profit rate trump all other notions of rights. I here want to explore another type of human right, that of the right to the city.

Has the astonishing pace and scale of urbanization over the last hundred years contributed to human well-being? The city, in the words of urban sociologist Robert Park, is:

man’s most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart’s desire. But, if the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself. [1]

The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.

From their inception, cities have arisen through geographical and social concentrations of a surplus product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon, since surpluses are extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while the control over their disbursement typically lies in a few hands. This general situation persists under capitalism, of course; but since urbanization depends on the mobilization of a surplus product, an intimate connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbanization. Capitalists have to produce a surplus product in order to produce surplus value; this in turn must be reinvested in order to generate more surplus value. The result of continued reinvestment is the expansion of surplus production at a compound rate—hence the logistic curves (money, output and population) attached to the history of capital accumulation, paralleled by the growth path of urbanization under capitalism.

The perpetual need to find profitable terrains for capital-surplus production and absorption shapes the politics of capitalism. It also presents the capitalist with a number of barriers to continuous and trouble-free expansion. If labour is scarce and wages are high, either existing labour has to be disciplined—technologically induced unemployment or an assault on organized working-class power are two prime methods—or fresh labour forces must be found by immigration, export of capital or proletarianization of hitherto independent elements of the population. Capitalists must also discover new means of production in general and natural resources in particular, which puts increasing pressure on the natural environment to yield up necessary raw materials and absorb the inevitable waste. They need to open up terrains for raw-material extraction—often the objective of imperialist and neo-colonial endeavours.

The coercive laws of competition also force the continuous implementation of new technologies and organizational forms, since these enable capitalists to out-compete those using inferior methods. Innovations define new wants and needs, reduce the turnover time of capital and lessen the friction of distance, which limits the geographical range within which the capitalist can search for expanded labour supplies, raw materials, and so on. If there is not enough purchasing power in the market, then new markets must be found by expanding foreign trade, promoting novel products and lifestyles, creating new credit instruments, and debt-financing state and private expenditures. If, finally, the profit rate is too low, then state regulation of ‘ruinous competition’, monopolization (mergers and acquisitions) and capital exports provide ways out.

If any of the above barriers cannot be circumvented, capitalists are unable profitably to reinvest their surplus product. Capital accumulation is blocked, leaving them facing a crisis, in which their capital can be devalued and in some instances even physically wiped out. Surplus commodities can lose value or be destroyed, while productive capacity and assets can be written down and left unused; money itself can be devalued through inflation, and labour through massive unemployment. How, then, has the need to circumvent these barriers and to expand the terrain of profitable activity driven capitalist urbanization? I argue here that urbanization has played a particularly active role, alongside such phenomena as military expenditures, in absorbing the surplus product that capitalists perpetually produce in their search for profits.
Urban revolutions

Consider, first, the case of Second Empire Paris. The year 1848 brought one of the first clear, and European-wide, crises of both unemployed surplus capital and surplus labour. It struck Paris particularly hard, and issued in an abortive revolution by unemployed workers and those bourgeois utopians who saw a social republic as the antidote to the greed and inequality that had characterized the July Monarchy. The republican bourgeoisie violently repressed the revolutionaries but failed to resolve the crisis. The result was the ascent to power of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, who engineered a coup in 1851 and proclaimed himself Emperor the following year. To survive politically, he resorted to widespread repression of alternative political movements. The economic situation he dealt with by means of a vast programme of infrastructural investment both at home and abroad. In the latter case, this meant the construction of railroads throughout Europe and into the Orient, as well as support for grand works such as the Suez Canal. At home, it meant consolidating the railway network, building ports and harbours, and draining marshes. Above all, it entailed the reconfiguration of the urban infrastructure of Paris. Bonaparte brought in Georges-Eugène Haussmann to take charge of the city’s public works in 1853.

Haussmann clearly understood that his mission was to help solve the surplus-capital and unemployment problem through urbanization. Rebuilding Paris absorbed huge quantities of labour and capital by the standards of the time and, coupled with suppressing the aspirations of the Parisian workforce, was a primary vehicle of social stabilization. He drew upon the utopian plans that Fourierists and Saint-Simonians had debated in the 1840s for reshaping Paris, but with one big difference: he transformed the scale at which the urban process was imagined. When the architect Jacques Ignace Hittorff showed Haussmann his plans for a new boulevard, Haussmann threw them back at him saying: ‘not wide enough . . . you have it 40 metres wide and I want it 120.’ He annexed the suburbs and redesigned whole neighbourhoods such as Les Halles. To do this Haussmann needed new financial institutions and debt instruments, the Crédit Mobilier and Crédit Immobilier, which were constructed on Saint-Simonian lines. In effect, he helped resolve the capital-surplus disposal problem by setting up a proto-Keynesian system of debt-financed infrastructural urban improvements.

The system worked very well for some fifteen years, and it involved not only a transformation of urban infrastructures but also the construction of a new way of life and urban persona. Paris became ‘the city of light’, the great centre of consumption, tourism and pleasure; the cafés, department stores, fashion industry and grand expositions all changed urban living so that it could absorb vast surpluses through consumerism. But then the overextended and speculative financial system and credit structures crashed in 1868. Haussmann was dismissed; Napoleon III in desperation went to war against Bismarck’s Germany and lost. In the ensuing vacuum arose the Paris Commune, one of the greatest revolutionary episodes in capitalist urban history, wrought in part out of a nostalgia for the world that Haussmann had destroyed and the desire to take back the city on the part of those dispossessed by his works. [2]

Fast forward now to the 1940s in the United States. The huge mobilization for the war effort temporarily resolved the capital-surplus disposal problem that had seemed so intractable in the 1930s, and the unemployment that went with it. But everyone was fearful about what would happen after the war. Politically the situation was dangerous: the federal government was in effect running a nationalized economy, and was in alliance with the Communist Soviet Union, while strong social movements with socialist inclinations had emerged in the 1930s. As in Louis Bonaparte’s era, a hefty dose of political repression was evidently called for by the ruling classes of the time; the subsequent history of McCarthyism and Cold War politics, of which there were already abundant signs in the early 40s, is all too familiar. On the economic front, there remained the question of how surplus capital could be absorbed.

In 1942, a lengthy evaluation of Haussmann’s efforts appeared in Architectural Forum. It documented in detail what he had done, attempted an analysis of his mistakes but sought to recuperate his reputation as one of the greatest urbanists of all time. The article was by none other than Robert Moses, who after the Second World War did to New York what Haussmann had done to Paris. [3] That is, Moses changed the scale of thinking about the urban process. Through a system of highways and infrastructural transformations, suburbanization and the total re-engineering of not just the city but also the whole metropolitan region, he helped resolve the capital-surplus absorption problem. To do this, he tapped into new financial institutions and tax arrangements that liberated the credit to debt-finance urban expansion. When taken nationwide to all the major metropolitan centres of the us—yet another transformation of scale—this process played a crucial role in stabilizing global capitalism after 1945, a period in which the us could afford to power the whole global non-communist economy by running trade deficits.

The suburbanization of the United States was not merely a matter of new infrastructures. As in Second Empire Paris, it entailed a radical transformation in lifestyles, bringing new products from housing to refrigerators and air conditioners, as well as two cars in the driveway and an enormous increase in the consumption of oil. It also altered the political landscape, as subsidized home-ownership for the middle classes changed the focus of community action towards the defence of property values and individualized identities, turning the suburban vote towards conservative republicanism. Debt-encumbered homeowners, it was argued, were less likely to go on strike. This project successfully absorbed the surplus and assured social stability, albeit at the cost of hollowing out the inner cities and generating urban unrest amongst those, chiefly African-Americans, who were denied access to the new prosperity.

By the end of the 1960s, a different kind of crisis began to unfold; Moses, like Haussmann, fell from grace, and his solutions came to be seen as inappropriate and unacceptable. Traditionalists rallied around Jane Jacobs and sought to counter the brutal modernism of Moses’s projects with a localized neighbourhood aesthetic. But the suburbs had been built, and the radical change in lifestyle that this betokened had many social consequences, leading feminists, for example, to proclaim the suburb as the locus of all their primary discontents. If Haussmannization had a part in the dynamics of the Paris Commune, the soulless qualities of suburban living also played a critical role in the dramatic events of 1968 in the us. Discontented white middle-class students went into a phase of revolt, sought alliances with marginalized groups claiming civil rights and rallied against American imperialism to create a movement to build another kind of world—including a different kind of urban experience.

In Paris, the campaign to stop the Left Bank Expressway and the destruction of traditional neighbourhoods by the invading ‘high-rise giants’ such as the Place d’Italie and Tour Montparnasse helped animate the larger dynamics of the 68 uprising. It was in this context that Henri Lefebvre wrote The Urban Revolution, which predicted not only that urbanization was central to the survival of capitalism and therefore bound to become a crucial focus of political and class struggle, but that it was obliterating step by step the distinctions between town and country through the production of integrated spaces across national territory, if not beyond. [4] The right to the city had to mean the right to command the whole urban process, which was increasingly dominating the countryside through phenomena ranging from agribusiness to second homes and rural tourism.

Along with the 68 revolt came a financial crisis within the credit institutions that, through debt-financing, had powered the property boom in the preceding decades. The crisis gathered momentum at the end of the 1960s until the whole capitalist system crashed, starting with the bursting of the global property-market bubble in 1973, followed by the fiscal bankruptcy of New York City in 1975. As William Tabb argued, the response to the consequences of the latter effectively pioneered the construction of a neoliberal answer to the problems of perpetuating class power and of reviving the capacity to absorb the surpluses that capitalism must produce to survive. [5]
Girding the globe

Fast forward once again to our current conjuncture. International capitalism has been on a roller-coaster of regional crises and crashes—East and Southeast Asia in 1997–98; Russia in 1998; Argentina in 2001—but had until recently avoided a global crash even in the face of a chronic inability to dispose of capital surplus. What was the role of urbanization in stabilizing this situation? In the United States, it is accepted wisdom that the housing sector was an important stabilizer of the economy, particularly after the high-tech crash of the late 1990s, although it was an active component of expansion in the earlier part of that decade. The property market directly absorbed a great deal of surplus capital through the construction of city-centre and suburban homes and office spaces, while the rapid inflation of housing asset prices—backed by a profligate wave of mortgage refinancing at historically low rates of interest—boosted the us domestic market for consumer goods and services. American urban expansion partially steadied the global economy, as the us ran huge trade deficits with the rest of the world, borrowing around $2 billion a day to fuel its insatiable consumerism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

But the urban process has undergone another transformation of scale. It has, in short, gone global. Property-market booms in Britain and Spain, as well as in many other countries, have helped power a capitalist dynamic in ways that broadly parallel what has happened in the United States. The urbanization of China over the last twenty years has been of a different character, with its heavy focus on infrastructural development, but it is even more important than that of the us. Its pace picked up enormously after a brief recession in 1997, to the extent that China has taken in nearly half the world’s cement supplies since 2000. More than a hundred cities have passed the one-million population mark in this period, and previously small villages, such as Shenzhen, have become huge metropolises of 6 to 10 million people. Vast infrastructural projects, including dams and highways—again, all debt-financed—are transforming the landscape. The consequences for the global economy and the absorption of surplus capital have been significant: Chile booms thanks to the high price of copper, Australia thrives and even Brazil and Argentina have recovered in part because of the strength of Chinese demand for raw materials.

Is the urbanization of China, then, the primary stabilizer of global capitalism today? The answer has to be a qualified yes. For China is only the epicentre of an urbanization process that has now become genuinely global, partly through the astonishing integration of financial markets that have used their flexibility to debt-finance urban development around the world. The Chinese central bank, for example, has been active in the secondary mortgage market in the us while Goldman Sachs was heavily involved in the surging property market in Mumbai, and Hong Kong capital has invested in Baltimore. In the midst of a flood of impoverished migrants, construction boomed in Johannesburg, Taipei, Moscow, as well as the cities in the core capitalist countries, such as London and Los Angeles. Astonishing if not criminally absurd mega-urbanization projects have emerged in the Middle East in places such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi, mopping up the surplus arising from oil wealth in the most conspicuous, socially unjust and environmentally wasteful ways possible.

This global scale makes it hard to grasp that what is happening is in principle similar to the transformations that Haussmann oversaw in Paris. For the global urbanization boom has depended, as did all the others before it, on the construction of new financial institutions and arrangements to organize the credit required to sustain it. Financial innovations set in train in the 1980s—securitizing and packaging local mortgages for sale to investors worldwide, and setting up new vehicles to hold collateralized debt obligations—played a crucial role. Their many benefits included spreading risk and permitting surplus savings pools easier access to surplus housing demand; they also brought aggregate interest rates down, while generating immense fortunes for the financial intermediaries who worked these wonders. But spreading risk does not eliminate it. Furthermore, the fact that it can be distributed so widely encourages even riskier local behaviours, because liability can be transferred elsewhere. Without adequate risk-assessment controls, this wave of financialization has now turned into the so-called sub-prime mortgage and housing asset-value crisis. The fallout was concentrated in the first instance in and around us cities, with particularly serious implications for low-income, inner-city African-Americans and households headed by single women. It also has affected those who, unable to afford the skyrocketing house prices in urban centres, especially in the Southwest, were forced into the metropolitan semi-periphery; here they took up speculatively built tract housing at initially easy rates, but now face escalating commuting costs as oil prices rise, and soaring mortgage payments as market rates come into effect.

The current crisis, with vicious local repercussions on urban life and infrastructures, also threatens the whole architecture of the global financial system and may trigger a major recession to boot. The parallels with the 1970s are uncanny—including the immediate easy-money response of the Federal Reserve in 2007–08, which will almost certainly generate strong currents of uncontrollable inflation, if not stagflation, in the not too distant future. However, the situation is far more complex now, and it is an open question whether China can compensate for a serious crash in the United States; even in the prc the pace of urbanization seems to be slowing down. The financial system is also more tightly coupled than it ever was before. [6] Computer-driven split-second trading always threatens to create a great divergence in the market—it is already producing incredible volatility in stock trading—that will precipitate a massive crisis, requiring a total re-think of how finance capital and money markets work, including their relation to urbanization.
Property and pacification

As in all the preceding phases, this most recent radical expansion of the urban process has brought with it incredible transformations of lifestyle. Quality of urban life has become a commodity, as has the city itself, in a world where consumerism, tourism, cultural and knowledge-based industries have become major aspects of the urban political economy. The postmodernist penchant for encouraging the formation of market niches—in both consumer habits and cultural forms—surrounds the contemporary urban experience with an aura of freedom of choice, provided you have the money. Shopping malls, multiplexes and box stores proliferate, as do fast-food and artisanal market-places. We now have, as urban sociologist Sharon Zukin puts it, ‘pacification by cappuccino’. Even the incoherent, bland and monotonous suburban tract development that continues to dominate in many areas now gets its antidote in a ‘new urbanism’ movement that touts the sale of community and boutique lifestyles to fulfill urban dreams. This is a world in which the neoliberal ethic of intense possessive individualism, and its cognate of political withdrawal from collective forms of action, becomes the template for human socialization. [7] The defence of property values becomes of such paramount political interest that, as Mike Davis points out, the home-owner associations in the state of California become bastions of political reaction, if not of fragmented neighbourhood fascisms. [8]

We increasingly live in divided and conflict-prone urban areas. In the past three decades, the neoliberal turn has restored class power to rich elites. Fourteen billionaires have emerged in Mexico since then, and in 2006 that country boasted the richest man on earth, Carlos Slim, at the same time as the incomes of the poor had either stagnated or diminished. The results are indelibly etched on the spatial forms of our cities, which increasingly consist of fortified fragments, gated communities and privatized public spaces kept under constant surveillance. In the developing world in particular, the city is splitting into different separated parts, with the apparent formation of many ‘microstates’. Wealthy neighbourhoods provided with all kinds of services, such as exclusive schools, golf courses, tennis courts and private police patrolling the area around the clock intertwine with illegal settlements where water is available only at public fountains, no sanitation system exists, electricity is pirated by a privileged few, the roads become mud streams whenever it rains, and where house-sharing is the norm. Each fragment appears to live and function autonomously, sticking firmly to what it has been able to grab in the daily fight for survival. [9]

Under these conditions, ideals of urban identity, citizenship and belonging—already threatened by the spreading malaise of a neoliberal ethic—become much harder to sustain. Privatized redistribution through criminal activity threatens individual security at every turn, prompting popular demands for police suppression. Even the idea that the city might function as a collective body politic, a site within and from which progressive social movements might emanate, appears implausible. There are, however, urban social movements seeking to overcome isolation and reshape the city in a different image from that put forward by the developers, who are backed by finance, corporate capital and an increasingly entrepreneurially minded local state apparatus.


Surplus absorption through urban transformation has an even darker aspect. It has entailed repeated bouts of urban restructuring through ‘creative destruction’, which nearly always has a class dimension since it is the poor, the underprivileged and those marginalized from political power that suffer first and foremost from this process. Violence is required to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old. Haussmann tore through the old Parisian slums, using powers of expropriation in the name of civic improvement and renovation. He deliberately engineered the removal of much of the working class and other unruly elements from the city centre, where they constituted a threat to public order and political power. He created an urban form where it was believed—incorrectly, as it turned out in 1871—that sufficient levels of surveillance and military control could be attained to ensure that revolutionary movements would easily be brought to heel. Nevertheless, as Engels pointed out in 1872:

In reality, the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the housing question after its fashion—that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution continually reproduces the question anew. This method is called ‘Haussmann’ . . . No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else . . . The same economic necessity which produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place. [10]

It took more than a hundred years to complete the embourgeoisement of central Paris, with the consequences seen in recent years of uprisings and mayhem in those isolated suburbs that trap marginalized immigrants, unemployed workers and youth. The sad point here, of course, is that what Engels described recurs throughout history. Robert Moses ‘took a meat axe to the Bronx’, in his infamous words, bringing forth long and loud laments from neighbourhood groups and movements. In the cases of Paris and New York, once the power of state expropriations had been successfully resisted and contained, a more insidious and cancerous progression took hold through municipal fiscal discipline, property speculation and the sorting of land-use according to the rate of return for its ‘highest and best use’. Engels understood this sequence all too well:

The growth of the big modern cities gives the land in certain areas, particularly in those areas which are centrally situated, an artificially and colossally increasing value; the buildings erected on these areas depress this value instead of increasing it, because they no longer belong to the changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others. This takes place above all with workers’ houses which are situated centrally and whose rents, even with the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public buildings are erected. [11]

Though this description was written in 1872, it applies directly to contemporary urban development in much of Asia—Delhi, Seoul, Mumbai—as well as gentrification in New York. A process of displacement and what I call ‘accumulation by dispossession’ lie at the core of urbanization under capitalism. [12] It is the mirror-image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment, and is giving rise to numerous conflicts over the capture of valuable land from low-income populations that may have lived there for many years.

Consider the case of Seoul in the 1990s: construction companies and developers hired goon squads of sumo-wrestler types to invade neighbourhoods on the city’s hillsides. They sledgehammered down not only housing but also all the possessions of those who had built their own homes in the 1950s on what had become premium land. High-rise towers, which show no trace of the brutality that permitted their construction, now cover most of those hillsides. In Mumbai, meanwhile, 6 million people officially considered as slum dwellers are settled on land without legal title; all maps of the city leave these places blank. With the attempt to turn Mumbai into a global financial centre to rival Shanghai, the property-development boom has gathered pace, and the land that squatters occupy appears increasingly valuable. Dharavi, one of the most prominent slums in Mumbai, is estimated to be worth $2 billion. The pressure to clear it—for environmental and social reasons that mask the land grab—is mounting daily. Financial powers backed by the state push for forcible slum clearance, in some cases violently taking possession of terrain occupied for a whole generation. Capital accumulation through real-estate activity booms, since the land is acquired at almost no cost.

Will the people who are displaced get compensation? The lucky ones get a bit. But while the Indian Constitution specifies that the state has an obligation to protect the lives and well-being of the whole population, irrespective of caste or class, and to guarantee rights to housing and shelter, the Supreme Court has issued judgements that rewrite this constitutional requirement. Since slum dwellers are illegal occupants and many cannot definitively prove their long-term residence, they have no right to compensation. To concede that right, says the Supreme Court, would be tantamount to rewarding pickpockets for their actions. So the squatters either resist and fight, or move with their few belongings to camp out on the sides of highways or wherever they can find a tiny space. [13] Examples of dispossession can also be found in the us, though these tend to be less brutal and more legalistic: the government’s right of eminent domain has been abused in order to displace established residents in reasonable housing in favour of higher-order land uses, such as condominiums and box stores. When this was challenged in the us Supreme Court, the justices ruled that it was constitutional for local jurisdictions to behave in this way in order to increase their property-tax base. [14]

The nail house - so called because it refused to be hammered down - had been isolated in a huge construction pit after other households agreed to move.

The "nail house" - so called because it refused to be hammered down - had been isolated in a huge construction pit after other households agreed to move.

In China millions are being dispossessed of the spaces they have long occupied—three million in Beijing alone. Since they lack private-property rights, the state can simply remove them by fiat, offering a minor cash payment to help them on their way before turning the land over to developers at a large profit. In some instances, people move willingly, but there are also reports of widespread resistance,

The developers won in the end.  Mrs Wuping demanded that she be given a comparable space in the new development and refused the small payment offered.

The developers won in the end. Mrs Wuping demanded that she be given a comparable space in the new development and refused the small payment offered.

the usual response to which is brutal repression by the Communist party. In the prc it is often populations on the rural margins who are displaced, illustrating the significance of Lefebvre’s argument, presciently laid out in the 1960s, that the clear distinction which once existed between the urban and the rural is gradually fading into a set of porous spaces of uneven geographical development, under the hegemonic command of capital and the state. This is also the case in India, where the central and state governments now favour the establishment of Special Economic Zones—ostensibly for industrial development, though most of the land is designated for urbanization. This policy has led to pitched battles against agricultural producers, the grossest of which was the massacre at Nandigram in West Bengal in March 2007, orchestrated by the state’s Marxist government. Intent on opening up terrain for the Salim Group, an Indonesian conglomerate, the ruling cpi(m) sent armed police to disperse protesting villagers; at least 14 were shot dead and dozens wounded. Private property rights in this case provided no protection.

What of the seemingly progressive proposal to award private-property rights to squatter populations, providing them with assets that will permit them to leave poverty behind? [15] Such a scheme is now being mooted for Rio’s favelas, for example. The problem is that the poor, beset with income insecurity and frequent financial difficulties, can easily be persuaded to trade in that asset for a relatively low cash payment. The rich typically refuse to give up their valued assets at any price, which is why Moses could take a meat axe to the low-income Bronx but not to affluent Park Avenue. The lasting effect of Margaret Thatcher’s privatization of social housing in Britain has been to create a rent and price structure throughout metropolitan London that precludes lower-income and even middle-class people from access to accommodation anywhere near the urban centre. I wager that within fifteen years, if present trends continue, all those hillsides in Rio now occupied by favelas will be covered by high-rise condominiums with fabulous views over the idyllic bay, while the erstwhile favela dwellers will have been filtered off into some remote periphery.
Formulating demands

Urbanization, we may conclude, has played a crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses, at ever increasing geographical scales, but at the price of burgeoning processes of creative destruction that have dispossessed the masses of any right to the city whatsoever. The planet as building site collides with the ‘planet of slums’. [16] Periodically this ends in revolt, as in Paris in 1871 or the us after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968. If, as seems likely, fiscal difficulties mount and the hitherto successful neoliberal, postmodernist and consumerist phase of capitalist surplus-absorption through urbanization is at an end and a broader crisis ensues, then the question arises: where is our 68 or, even more dramatically, our version of the Commune? As with the financial system, the answer is bound to be much more complex precisely because the urban process is now global in scope. Signs of rebellion are everywhere: the unrest in China and India is chronic, civil wars rage in Africa, Latin America is in ferment. Any of these revolts could become contagious. Unlike the fiscal system, however, the urban and peri-urban social movements of opposition, of which there are many around the world, are not tightly coupled; indeed most have no connection to each other. If they somehow did come together, what should they demand?

The answer to the last question is simple enough in principle: greater democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus. Since the urban process is a major channel of surplus use, establishing democratic management over its urban deployment constitutes the right to the city. Throughout capitalist history, some of the surplus value has been taxed, and in social-democratic phases the proportion at the state’s disposal rose significantly. The neoliberal project over the last thirty years has been oriented towards privatizing that control. The data for all oecd countries show, however, that the state’s portion of gross output has been roughly constant since the 1970s. [17] The main achievement of the neoliberal assault, then, has been to prevent the public share from expanding as it did in the 1960s. Neoliberalism has also created new systems of governance that integrate state and corporate interests, and through the application of money power, it has ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through the state apparatus favours corporate capital and the upper classes in shaping the urban process. Raising the proportion of the surplus held by the state will only have a positive impact if the state itself is brought back under democratic control.

Increasingly, we see the right to the city falling into the hands of private or quasi-private interests. In New York City, for example, the billionaire mayor, Michael Bloomberg, is reshaping the city along lines favourable to developers, Wall Street and transnational capitalist-class elements, and promoting the city as an optimal location for high-value businesses and a fantastic destination for tourists. He is, in effect, turning Manhattan into one vast gated community for the rich. In Mexico City, Carlos Slim had the downtown streets re-cobbled to suit the tourist gaze. Not only affluent individuals exercise direct power. In the town of New Haven, strapped for resources for urban reinvestment, it is Yale, one of the wealthiest universities in the world, that is redesigning much of the urban fabric to suit its needs. Johns Hopkins is doing the same for East Baltimore, and Columbia University plans to do so for areas of New York, sparking neighbourhood resistance movements in both cases. The right to the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires.

Every January, the Office of the New York State Comptroller publishes an estimate of the total Wall Street bonuses for the previous twelve months. In 2007, a disastrous year for financial markets by any measure, these added up to $33.2 billion, only 2 per cent less than the year before. In mid-summer of 2007, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank poured billions of dollars’ worth of short-term credit into the financial system to ensure its stability, and thereafter the Fed dramatically lowered interest rates or pumped in vast amounts of liquidity every time the Dow threatened to fall precipitously. Meanwhile, some two million people have been or are about to be made homeless by foreclosures. Many city neighbourhoods and even whole peri-urban communities in the us have been boarded up and vandalized, wrecked by the predatory lending practices of the financial institutions. This population is due no bonuses. Indeed, since foreclosure means debt forgiveness, which is regarded as income in the United States, many of those evicted face a hefty income-tax bill for money they never had in their possession. This asymmetry cannot be construed as anything less than a massive form of class confrontation. A ‘Financial Katrina’ is unfolding, which conveniently (for the developers) threatens to wipe out low-income neighbourhoods on potentially high-value land in many inner-city areas far more effectively and speedily than could be achieved through eminent domain.

We have yet, however, to see a coherent opposition to these developments in the twenty-first century. There are, of course, already a great many diverse social movements focusing on the urban question—from India and Brazil to China, Spain, Argentina and the United States. In 2001, a City Statute was inserted into the Brazilian Constitution, after pressure from social movements, to recognize the collective right to the city. [18] In the us, there have been calls for much of the $700 billion bail-out for financial institutions to be diverted into a Reconstruction Bank, which would help prevent foreclosures and fund efforts at neighbourhood revitalization and infrastructural renewal at municipal level. The urban crisis that is affecting millions would then be prioritized over the needs of big investors and financiers. Unfortunately the social movements are not strong enough or sufficiently mobilized to force through this solution. Nor have these movements yet converged on the singular aim of gaining greater control over the uses of the surplus—let alone over the conditions of its production.

At this point in history, this has to be a global struggle, predominantly with finance capital, for that is the scale at which urbanization processes now work. To be sure, the political task of organizing such a confrontation is difficult if not daunting. However, the opportunities are multiple because, as this brief history shows, crises repeatedly erupt around urbanization both locally and globally, and because the metropolis is now the point of massive collision—dare we call it class struggle?—over the accumulation by dispossession visited upon the least well-off and the developmental drive that seeks to colonize space for the affluent.

One step towards unifying these struggles is to adopt the right to the city as both working slogan and political ideal, precisely because it focuses on the question of who commands the necessary connection between urbanization and surplus production and use. The democratization of that right, and the construction of a broad social movement to enforce its will is imperative if the dispossessed are to take back the control which they have for so long been denied, and if they are to institute new modes of urbanization. Lefebvre was right to insist that the revolution has to be urban, in the broadest sense of that term, or nothing at all.

[1] Robert Park, On Social Control and Collective Behavior, Chicago 1967, p. 3.

[2] For a fuller account, see David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity, New York 2003.

[3] Robert Moses, ‘What Happened to Haussmann?’, Architectural Forum, vol. 77 (July 1942), pp. 57–66.

[4] Henri Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution, Minneapolis 2003; and Writings on Cities, Oxford 1996.

[5] William Tabb, The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis, New York 1982.

[6] Richard Bookstaber, A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds and the Perils of Financial Innovation, Hoboken, nj 2007.

[7] Hilde Nafstad et al., ‘Ideology and Power: The Influence of Current Neoliberalism in Society’, Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, vol. 17, no. 4 (July 2007), pp. 313–27.

[8] Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, London and New York 1990.

[9] Marcello Balbo, ‘Urban Planning and the Fragmented City of Developing Countries’, Third World Planning Review, vol. 15, no. 1 (1993), pp. 23–35.

[10] Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question, New York 1935, pp. 74–7.

[11] Engels, Housing Question, p. 23.

[12] Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford 2003, chapter 4.

[13] Usha Ramanathan, ‘Illegality and the Urban Poor’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 July 2006; Rakesh Shukla, ‘Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court’, Economic and Political Weekly, 2 September 2006.

[14] Kelo v. New London, ct, decided on 23 June 2005 in case 545 us 469 (2005).

[15] Much of this thinking follows the work of Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York 2000; see the critical examination by Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes its World’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, vol. 46, no. 2 (August 2005), pp. 297–320.

[16] Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, London and New York 2006.

[17] oecd Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, Paris 2008, p. 225.

[18] Edésio Fernandes, ‘Constructing the “Right to the City” in Brazil’, Social and Legal Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (June 2007), pp. 201–19.

By the same author:

Reinventing Geography

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Is Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy?

Somali pirates have accused European firms of dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast and are demanding an $8m ransom for the return of a Ukranian ship they captured, saying the money will go towards cleaning up the waste.

The ransom demand is a means of “reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our country for nearly 20 years”, Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirates, based in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, said.

“The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas.”

The pirates are holding the MV Faina, a Ukrainian ship carrying tanks and military hardware, off Somalia’s northern coast.

According to the International Maritime Bureau, 61 attacks by pirates have been reported since the start of the year.

While money is the primary objective of the hijackings, claims of the continued environmental destruction off Somalia’s coast have been largely ignored by the regions’s maritime authorities.

Dumping allegations

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN envoy for Somalia confirmed to Al Jazeera the world body has “reliable information” that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic waste, including nuclear waste, off the Somali coastline.

“I must stress however, that no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible,” he said

The pirates are holding the MV Faina off Somalia’s northern coast [Reuters]
Allegations of the dumping of toxic waste, as well as illegal fishing, have circulated since the early 1990s.

But evidence of such practices literally appeared on the beaches of northern Somalia when the tsunami of 2004 hit the country.

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reported the tsunami had washed up rusting containers of toxic waste on the shores of Puntland.

Nick Nuttall, a UNEP spokesman, told Al Jazeera that when the barrels were smashed open by the force of the waves, the containers exposed a “frightening activity” that has been going on for more than decade.

“Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there,” he said.

“European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as $2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a tonne.

“And the waste is many different kinds. There is uranium radioactive waste. There is lead, and heavy metals like cadmium and mercury. There is also industrial waste, and there are hospital wastes, chemical wastes – you name it.”

Nuttall also said that since the containers came ashore, hundreds of residents have fallen ill, suffering from mouth and abdominal bleeding, skin infections and other ailments.

“We [the UNEP] had planned to do a proper, in-depth scientific assessment on the magnitude of the problem. But because of the high levels of insecurity onshore and off the Somali coast, we are unable to carry out an accurate assessment of the extent of the problem,” he said.

However, Ould-Abdallah claims the practice still continues.

“What is most alarming here is that nuclear waste is being dumped. Radioactive uranium waste that is potentially killing Somalis and completely destroying the ocean,” he said.

Toxic waste

Ould-Abdallah declined to name which companies are involved in waste dumping, citing legal reasons.

But he did say the practice helps fuel the 18-year-old civil war in Somalia as companies are paying Somali government ministers to dump their waste, or to secure licences and contracts.

“There is no government control … and there are few people with high moral ground … [and] yes, people in high positions are being paid off, but because of the fragility of the TFG [Transitional Federal Government], some of these companies now no longer ask the authorities – they simply dump their waste and leave.”

Ould-Abdallah said there are ethical questions to be considered because the companies are negotiating contracts with a government that is largely divided along tribal lines.

“How can you negotiate these dealings with a country at war and with a government struggling to remain relevant?”

In 1992, a contract to secure the dumping of toxic waste was made by Swiss and Italian shipping firms Achair Partners and Progresso, with Nur Elmi Osman, a former official appointed to the government of Ali Mahdi Mohamed, one of many militia leaders involved in the ousting of Mohamed Siad Barre, Somalia’s former president.

At the request of the Swiss and Italian governments, UNEP investigated the matter.

Both firms had denied entering into any agreement with militia leaders at the beginning of the Somali civil war.

Osman also denied signing any contract.

‘Mafia involvement’

However, Mustafa Tolba, the former UNEP executive director, told Al Jazeera that he discovered the firms were set up as fictitious companies by larger industrial firms to dispose of hazardous waste.

“At the time, it felt like we were dealing with the Mafia, or some sort of organised crime group, possibly working with these industrial firms,” he said.

Nations have found it difficult to tackle
the problem of piracy [AFP]
“It was very shady, and quite underground, and I would agree with Ould-Abdallah’s claims that it is still going on… Unfortunately the war has not allowed environmental groups to investigate this fully.”

The Italian mafia controls an estimated 30 per cent of Italy’s waste disposal companies, including those that deal with toxic waste.

In 1998, Famiglia Cristiana, an Italian weekly magazine, claimed that although most of the waste-dumping took place after the start of the civil war in 1991, the activity actually began as early as 1989 under the Barre government.

Beyond the ethical question of trying to secure a hazardous waste agreement in an unstable country like Somalia, the alleged attempt by Swiss and Italian firms to dump waste in Somalia would violate international treaties to which both countries are signatories.

Legal ramifications

Switzerland and Italy signed and ratified the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, which came into force in 1992.

EU member states, as well as 168 other countries have also signed the agreement.

The convention prohibits waste trade between countries that have signed the convention, as well as countries that have not signed the accord unless a bilateral agreement had been negotiated.

It is also prohibits the shipping of hazardous waste to a war zone.

Abdi Ismail Samatar, professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota, told Al Jazeera that because an international coalition of warships has been deployed to the Gulf of Aden, the alleged dumping of waste must have been observed.

Environmental damage

“If these acts are continuing, then surely they must have been seen by someone involved in maritime operations,” he said.

“Is the cargo aimed at a certain destination more important than monitoring illegal activities in the region? Piracy is not the only problem for Somalia, and I think it’s irresponsible on the part of the authorities to overlook this issue.”

Mohammed Gure, chairman of the Somalia Concern Group, said that the social and environmental consequences will be felt for decades.

“The Somali coastline used to sustain hundreds of thousands of people, as a source of food and livelihoods. Now much of it is almost destroyed, primarily at the hands of these so-called ministers that have sold their nation to fill their own pockets.”

Ould-Abdallah said piracy will not prevent waste dumping.

“The intentions of these pirates are not concerned with protecting their environment,” he said.

“What is ultimately needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and take control of its affairs.”

Source: Al Jazeera

Consumption Joy is over for the American

Economics Professor Richard D Wolff speaks.

The world’s food insecurity

Paul Rogers

The severity of today’s world food crisis resembles that of the early 1970s. But the role of the financial sector and of global climate change are key differences, says Paul Rogers.

The food crisis is now affecting many countries across the world. Millions of people in dozens of countries are unable to afford the food they need, and malnutrition is on the rise. From Egypt to Indonesia, Haiti to Thailand, and across many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, increasingly vociferous public protests over food prices or shortages have exploded; some governments even fear for their survival (see Marc Lacey, “Across globe, hunger brings rising anger”, International Herald Tribune, 18 April 2008).

United Nations analysts and other research specialists describe this as the worst crisis since the early 1970s. They blame many factors:

increased demand for meat diets in richer countries

climatic factors, especially the kind of drought that has cut Australia’s rice production by 98% (Keith Bradsher, “A drought in Australia, a global shortage of rice”, New York Times, 17 April 2008 )

the diversion of agricultural land to grow crops for biofuel (see James Painter, “Indonesia: the biofuel blowback”, 30 August 2007)

the steep increases in the price of oil (see Paul Krugman, “Running Out of Planet to Exploit”, New York Times, 21 April 2008).

The 1970s precedent

What is extraordinary about the current situation is that it echoes in so many respects an earlier world food crisis: that of 1973-74 (it also remains fresh in the memory, as I worked in tropical-agricultural research in the late 1960s and attended the world food conference of 5-16 November 1974 as an observer for Britain’s World Development Movement). In comparing the two moments, what is truly astonishing is that – despite all the supposed progress of the globalised world Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001 economy, all the much-lauded economic growth, and all the scientific and technological developments in the interim period – so little has changed (see Heidi Fritschel, “The price of food: ingredients of a global crisis”, 9 April 2008).

The crisis came to a head in the winter of 1973-74. It caught most agronomists and food-policy specialists by surprise, especially as the decade beforehand had seemed to show much promise. The first fruits of the “green revolution” in crop-breeding – the new “miracle” rice varieties such as IR8 and IR11 among them – were giving hope that radical advances in tropical agriculture would enable the poorest farmers to become much more self-reliant. The world still had over 400 million people suffering from malnutrition (in a total population of 3.7 billion in 1970), but there was optimism that substantial progress to address the roots of their condition and improve their lives was possible.

In only a few years, this mood dissipated. The terrible famine in Bangladesh in 1971 (related to the disruptive effects of its war of independence from Pakistani rule) contributed to the shift. By early 1974, one senior United Nations source was warning that 40 million people in thirty countries were at risk of starvation – a catastrophe that could be ten times worse than the appalling Bengal famine of 1943-44. The immediate problem was that those countries most at risk needed at least 10 million tons of additional food grains within a year – yet most could not afford to pay for them. A further problem was a world shortage of fertilisers (amounting to around 1.5 million tons), which had to be addressed to avoid further bad harvests (see Paul Rogers, Food in Our Time – But Not Just Yet, World Development Movement, London, 1975).

The United Nations system, then led by (the later discredited) secretary-general Kurt Waldheim – responded by convening a world food conference in Rome in November 1974, under the auspices of the UN’s Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It hoped both to galvanise richer countries into paying for these immediate needs and to establish procedures and institutions that would prevent a repeat of the crisis.

A major concern at the gathering was that the crisis was complex and multi-causal. Three long-term trends had collided with a series of short-term events to produce a dangerous situation that required a thorough and sophisticated approach in response.

The first trend was that most countries had not yet started to go through a demographic transition, yet many were experiencing population growth-rates of 3% per year or above. Moreover, such countries typically had a large proportion of their population under the age of 14 – a category that clearly could not contribute much to food production but had high nutritional needs.

The second long-term trend was the relative neglect of rural development throughout the 1950s and 1960s, when most development emphasis was on urbanisation and industrialisation, in an effort to transform the lives of the great majority of people in the “third world” who lived off the land.

The third trend was that economic growth in industrialised states in the 1960s had resulted in a move towards more meat-rich diets, with all the inefficiencies of ecological conversion rates that this involved – typically ten kilos of plant protein to produce one kilo of animal protein.

The roots of crisis

In addition, the crisis of 1973-74 had four immediate causes:

# Poor weather conditions in many parts of the world. These began with the devastating cyclone that hit Bangladesh in November 1970; and were followed by the impact of a long drought in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, the partial failure of the Soviet winter cereal crop in 1972-73, and serious floods in northern India

# A substantial increase in fertiliser prices. This was partly due to the behaviour of a notoriously “pendulum” industry, and partly to Morocco’s decision to seek to improve its earnings from rock phosphate (a key compound constituent of fertiliser) by trebling its price between January and July 1974

# A huge increase in oil prices. The price of oil rose by nearly 450% from October 1973 to May 1974. The trend started with Opec action around the time of the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war in October 1973, but it merged into an all-time bull-market that rapidly affected the economies of many “third world” countries as they struggled to pay for oil imports

# The partial failure of the green revolution. Many of the new miracle-plant varieties were indeed remarkable, but they depended on the ability of the farmers growing them to afford the fertilisers, pesticides and adequate irrigation that they so often required. When prices of fuel and fertiliser were high, the miracle-plant varieties were starved of precisely those inputs needed to maximise yields.

The world community’s response

The crisis was reaching its peak at the very time of the FAO’s world food conference. The concluding declaration was resounding enough: it pledged that “every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties.” In pursuit of this large aspiration, the conference proposed a three-point plan to prevent similar crises in the future:

The establishment of a world food bank. This would maintain continual access to around 10 million tonnes of stored grain that could be made freely available in time of need

A new International Fund for Agricultural Development that would commit $5 billion a year for ten years to improve tropical agriculture, not least at the level of subsistence farmers. This was more than three times the worldwide investment at that time (though it also represented barely 2% of annual global spending on the military)

A new food forecasting system that would provide early warning of future crises.

The twelve-day congress in Rome was prominently reported in the world’s media; leading figures (including Henry Kissinger, then United States secretary of state) jetted in to speak fine words, while promising little action. Nonetheless, emergency funding in 1974-76 (not least by some of the newly oil-rich countries of the Gulf) helped improve the situation in some of the worst affected countries, including Bangladesh.

This reaction helped avert the potential of famine or ameliorate its effects. But little was done to invest in improved food production over the longer term. A food forecasting system was developed by the FAO, which remains effective to this day; but the idea of a world food bank made little progress, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development has never received the resources it needed.

Perhaps most revealing of all was that even at the height of the crisis, world food reserves were still adequate to meet all the demands – the problem was that the food was simply too expensive for the poorest to afford it. The important work of Amartya Sen helped transform understanding of this point, and of the connections between food insecurity, markets and poverty. The logic of Sen’s pathbreaking argument was to highlight the importance of political freedom and the free flow of information as a crucial factor in the avoidance of famine (see Development as Freedom [Oxford University Press, 1999]).

The new agenda

The lessons of the early 1970s – both policy and intellectual – are still far from being learned. The problems of food insecurity today, albeit widespread and serious, are not yet of the scale of the early 1970s; but the very fact that they are happening, and on a global scale, is itself a severe judgment on In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click here the world’s institutions of governance at both national and international levels (see World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, October 2007).

What makes the current crisis even more worrying is the presence of two trends that were either absent or less pressing in the 1970s. First, the role of the now-globalised financial sector, where hedge-fund and other forms of speculation in the food-commodity markets have fuelled the price rises and in effect, intensified hunger, poverty and instability. This is an unexplored aspect of the world’s food problem that demands to be on the agenda of those attempting to solve it (see “The silent tsunami”, Economist, 17 April 2008 )

Second, the crisis of 2007-08 is unfolding in an era when the effects of climate change are intensifying – but where the full range of the impact of global warming is yet to be felt (see “A century on the edge: 1945-2045”, 29 December 2008). Even the existing adverse weather phenomena that have been experienced in recent years, that may relate to longer-term climate change (hurricanes, floods, droughts) are likely to be exceeded over the next decade or more. The consequences for food production and human livelihood will be enormous (see the report of the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development [IAASTD], 15 April 2008 ).

The one possible source of optimism in present circumstances is that citizens around the world will use the information and understanding at their disposal to work together to help create the momentum Amartya Sen has written: for serious, sustained action (both emergency and long-term) that can help put food in hungry stomachs. The absence of such action after the crisis of the early 1970s casts a shadow over the present. The fact that the challenge now is in key respects even higher makes the need to find a coherent and effective set of answers all the more pressing. The global public is indeed at the centre of this quest. As

“To eliminate the problem of hunger, the political framework of democracy and an uncensored press can make a substantial contribution, but it also calls for activism of the public. Ultimately, the effectiveness of public action depends not only on legislation, but also on the force and vigour of democratic practice. There is a need to move ahead on different fronts simultaneously to eradicate hunger in the modern world. The public is not only the beneficiary of that eradication, but in an important sense, it also has to be its primary instrument. The first step is to see the public as the active agent rather than merely as the long-suffering patient.”

Ethanol Hoax Spreads Economic Havoc

by Walter E. Williams

Ethanol is so costly that it wouldn’t make it in a free market.

One of the many mandates of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 calls for oil companies to increase the amount of ethanol mixed with gasoline. During his 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush said, “America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.” Let’s look at some of the “wonders” of ethanol as a replacement for gasoline.

Ethanol contains water that distillation cannot remove. As such, it can cause major damage to automobile engines not specifically designed to burn ethanol. The water content of ethanol also risks pipeline corrosion and thus must be shipped by truck, rail car or barge. These shipping methods are far more expensive than pipelines.

Ethanol is 20-30% less efficient than gasoline, making it more expensive per highway mile. It takes 450 pounds of corn to produce the ethanol to fill one SUV tank. That’s enough corn to feed one person for a year. Plus, it takes more than one gallon of fossil fuel—oil and natural gas—to produce one gallon of ethanol. After all, corn must be grown, fertilized, harvested and trucked to ethanol producers—all of which are fuel-using activities. And, it takes 1,700 gallons of water to produce one gallon of ethanol. On top of all this, if our total annual corn output were put to ethanol production, it would reduce gasoline consumption by 10-12%.

Ethanol is so costly that it wouldn’t make it in a free market. That’s why Congress has enacted major ethanol subsidies, about $1.05 to $1.38 a gallon, which is no less than a tax on consumers. In fact, there’s a double tax—one in the form of ethanol subsidies and another in the form of handouts to corn farmers to the tune of $9.5 billion in 2005.

There’s something else wrong with this picture. If Congress and President Bush say we need less reliance on oil and greater use of renewable fuels, then why would Congress impose a stiff tariff, 54 cents a gallon, on ethanol from Brazil? Brazilian ethanol, by the way, is produced from sugar cane and is far more energy efficient, cleaner and cheaper to produce.

Ethanol production has driven up the prices of corn-fed livestock, chicken and dairy products, and products made from corn. As a result of higher demand for corn, other grain prices, such as soybean and wheat, have risen dramatically. The fact that the U.S. is the world’s largest grain producer and exporter means that the ethanol-induced higher grain prices will have a worldwide impact on food prices.

It’s easy to understand how the public, looking for cheaper gasoline, can be taken in by the call for increased ethanol usage. But politicians, corn farmers and ethanol producers know they are running a cruel hoax on the American consumer. They are in it for the money. Ethanol producers and the farm lobby have pressured farm-state congressmen into believing that it would be political suicide if they didn’t support subsidized ethanol production. That’s the stick. Campaign contributions are the carrot.

The ethanol hoax is a good example of a problem economists refer to as narrow, well-defined benefits versus widely dispersed costs. It pays the ethanol lobby to organize and collect money to grease the palms of politicians willing to do their bidding because there’s a large benefit for them. The millions of gasoline consumers, who fund the benefits through higher fuel and food prices, as well as taxes, are relatively uninformed and have little clout. After all, who do you think a politician will invite into his office to have a heart-to-heart—you or an ethanol executive?